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	This	paper	explores	 the	possible	contextual	 factors	 that	drove	some	 individuals	 to	lead,	and	others	 to	 join	 the	pro-secessionist	 rebellion	 in	 the	2013-2014	conflict	 in	Eastern	 Ukraine.	 We	 expand	 on	 the	 existing	 rational	 choice	 literature	 on	revolutionary	 participation	 and	 rebellious	 movements	 by	 building	 a	 contextual	choice	model	accounting	for	both	cost-benefit	and	behavioral	considerations	taken	by	Pro-Russian	militants	and	rebels	in	the	region	of	Donbass.	Our	model	generates	predictions	about	 the	characteristics	of	 the	socio-political-cultural	context	 that	are	most	 likely	 to	 ignite	 and	 sustain	hierarchical	 rebel	movements	 similar	 to	 those	 in	Ukraine.			
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1. Introduction			 Over	the	past	decade,	Russia	has	re-emerged	as	a	world	military	force.	Since	his	return	to	power,	Vladimir	Putin	has	made	it	clear	that	he	intends	his	sphere	of	influence	to	include	all	ethnic	Russians	across	the	world,	especially	those	inhabiting	the	 countries	 of	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Bloc.	 Ukraine	 has	 become	 the	 latest	 testing	ground	 for	 the	 Russian	 geopolitical	 rhetoric.	 Pressures	 from	 both	 east	 and	 west	have	led	to	the	armed	conflict	between	pro-Kiev	and	pro-Russian	forces,	commonly	known	 as	 the	War	 in	 Donbass,	which	 has	 dominated	 the	 news	 over	 the	 past	 two																																																									†	Email:	olganicoara@gmail.com.	Address:	Department	of	Business	and	Economics,	Ursinus	College,	601	E.	Main	Street,	100	West	College	St.,	Collegeville,	PA	19426.	*	Email:	whiteda@denison.edu	Address:	Department	of	Mathematics	and	Computer	Science,	Denison	University,	100	West	College	St.,	Granville,	OH	43023.		
Page 2 of 29	
years.	This	conflict	is	shaping	up	to	be	a	defining	event	in	the	relationship	between	Putin's	Russia	and	the	West.		The	ongoing	war	in	Ukraine,	has	been	preceded	by	similar	separatist	movements	backed	 by	 Russian	military	 forces:	 in	 Transnistria	 (Moldova,	 1992),	 and	 in	 South	Ossetia	(Georgia,	2008),	resulting	in	the	existing,	so	called	“frozen	conflicts”.	 If	our	goal	 is	 to	 predict	 and	 attenuate	 future	 cases	 of	 global	 violence,	 the	 key	 task	 is	 to	identify	 and	 distinguish	 all	 the	 possible	 causes	 for	 conflict.	 Given	 Moscow’s	involvement	 in	 Ukraine—as	 reported	 by	 the	 media	 and	 by	 the	 Organization	 for	Security	and	Cooperation	(OSCE)—two	questions	arise.	First,	how	much	of	the	pro-separation	 conflict	 in	 Eastern	 Ukraine	 arose	 as	 a	 result	 of	 actual	 democracy	demands	by	the	Russian	ethnics?	Second,	how	much	of	the	conflict	was	induced	or	provoked	 by	 Russian	 political	 propaganda	 and	 deliberate	 interference	 with	 the	incentives	 faced	by	 the	population?	Compared	 to	past	cases	of	breakaway	wars	 in	other	 former	 Soviet	 republics	 (e.g.,	 Moldova	 and	 Georgia),	 the	 War	 in	 Donbass	stands	out	in	its	military	force	and	violence.	What	factors	influenced	the	decision	of	individuals	of	ethnically	and	politically	distinct	groups	to	start	and	fight	this	violent	secession	war	in	Ukraine?		What	was	the	logic	of	collective	action	in	the	Ukrainian	war?	The	rational	choice	literature	accounts	for	the	manifestation	of	various	rebellious	events	and	outcomes	in	 history	 (see	Mahoney	 2000).	 It	 assumes	 that	 rebellions	 are	 a	manifestation	 of	uneasiness	with	 a	 dominant	 regime,	 and	 that	most	 often	 individuals	 in	 repressed	societies	 fail	 to	 start	 a	 revolution	 due	 to	 inherent	 collective	 action	 problems	 that	plague	large	groups	of	 individuals	even	if	they	would	jointly	benefit	from	it	(Olson	
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1965,	 Ireland	 1967,	 Tullock	 1971,	 Tullock	 1974,	 Lichbach	 1994,	 1995,	 Leeson	2010).	What	 stops	 rebellions	 from	occurring	 from	a	pure	 cost-benefit	 perspective	are	 the	 disincentives	 created	 by	 the	 high	 costs	 of	 individual	 participation	 in	 and	leading	of	a	revolution.	As	rebellions	require	large	groups	for	success,	they	produce	larger	incentives	for	individuals	to	free	ride	on	the	participation	and	leadership	acts	of	 others.	 Under	 the	 free	 rider’s	 premise,	 historically,	 one	 way	 small,	 rebellious	groups	were	able	to	overcome	the	incentive	problems	was	by	devising	a	diversity	of	institutional	 solutions	 that	 improved	 the	 cost-benefit	 balance	 of	 individual	participation,	leadership,	and	ultimately	successful	collective	action	(Lichbach	1994,	1995,	Leeson	2010).	Timur	Kuran	theorized	that	individuals	in	communist	societies	deliberately	falsified	their	(true)	preferences	about	the	regime,	up	to	a	critical	point	that	 eventually	 triggered,	 from	 “sparks”	 to	 “prairie	 fires”,	 the	 mass	 protests	 and	revolutions	 that	 took	 place	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 communism	(Kuran	1989).	Several	 other	 studies	 include	 the	 role	 of	 socio-political-cultural	 context	 in	 the	rise	of	secessionist	movements	in	the	world	and	in	the	former	Soviet	space	(see,	for	example,	Pavkovic	and	Radan	2013;	Coppieters	and	Sawka	2003).	In	this	paper,	we	extend	the	existing	contextual	studies	of	and	the	existing	solutions	to	revolutionary	non/participation	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Tilly	 1978;	 Kuran	 1989,	 1991;	 Moore	 1995;	Kuran	 1989,	 1991;	 Lichbach	 1994,	 1995;	 Kurrild-Klitgaard	 1997;	 Petersen	 2001;	Leeson	 2010)	 and	 violent	 secessionist	 movements	 (Moore	 1998,	 Hale	 2000),	 by	building	a	contextual	choice	model	that	accounts	for	both	behavioral	and	pure	cost-
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benefit	considerations1	taken	by	the	individuals	in	the	different	groups	of	militants	and	rebels	in	Donbass,	Eastern	Ukraine.		Our	 model	 extends	 the	 theoretical	 approaches	 in	 Tullock	 (1971,	 later	 1974),	Kuran	(1989,	1991),	Lichbach	(1994,	1995),	and	Leeson	(2010),	and	adds	a	term	to	factor	 in	cultural	beliefs	and	values.	The	contextual	 feature	of	our	model	of	choice	generates	 predictions	 about	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 socio-political-cultural	contexts	 that	 are	most	 likely	 to	 ignite	 and	 sustain	 violent	 rebel	 groups	 similar	 to	those	in	Ukraine.			We	 focus	 solely	 on	 the	 contextual	 aspects	 of	 choice	 of	 individuals	 in	Donbass,	and	our	intention	is	to	understand	the	effects	of	history,	politics,	and	culture	in	their	calculations	of	participation	or	leadership	of	protests	or	rebellions.	We	then	discuss	how	these	key	factors	might	have	resulted	in	frozen	conflict	areas	in	former	Soviet	Bloc	 countries	 in	 the	past,	 and	what	 steps	might	be	 taken	 to	avoid	 replicating	 the	conflict	 in	Ukraine	in	the	future.	Due	to	our	focus	on	Donbass	and	Russia,	we	have	not	included	a	discussion	of	the	motivations	of	Euromaidan	protesters	in	Kiev	or	of	Russian	 supporting	 residents	 of	 Crimea.	We	do,	 however,	 demonstrate	 how	 these	events	outside	of	Donbass	affected	the	budding	rebellion.			
2. Background	on	the	Secessionist	Movement	in	Eastern	Ukraine			 In	 this	section,	we	present	 the	chronology	of	events	 in	Donbass	 from	the	early	part	of	2014.	These	events	demonstrate	that	there	were	steep	costs	for	individuals																																																									1	In	Roger	Petersen’s	approach	to	explaining	individual	rebellious	action:	“Whether	individuals	come	to	act	as	rebels	or	collaborators,	killers	or	victims,	heroes	or	cowards	during	times	of	upheaval	is	largely	determined	by	the	nature	of	their	everyday	economic,	social,	and	political	life,	both	in	the	time	of	the	upheaval	and	the	period	prior	to	it.	The	extraordinary	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	ordinary.”	(Petersen	2001)	
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(e.g.	pro-Kiev	demonstrators)	acting	against	the	goals	of	the	Pro-Russian	militants,	and	 benefits	 to	 individuals	 acting	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 pro-Russian	 movement.	 These	events	 also	 demonstrate	 the	 role	 Russian	 propaganda	 played	 in	 convincing	members	 of	 the	pro-Russian	movement	 to	 act	 on	 their	 beliefs	 (e.g.	 via	 convincing	them	that	they	would	be	supported	by	Russia).	Russian	propaganda	has	been	present	in	Donbass	for	the	past	several	years,	and	 its	volume	 increased	when	Vladimir	Putin	 took	over	media	outlets	and	began	his	 program	 of	 calling	 on	 ethnic	 Russians	 everywhere	 (Sonne,	 2014).	 Freedom	House,	 a	 watchdog	 organization	 devoted	 to	 promoting	 freedom,	 maintains	information	 about	 media	 outlets	 across	 the	 world.	 They	 report	 (2014)	 that	 the	Russian	 government	 restricts	 international	 radio	 and	 television	 broadcasting.	 In	particular,	 the	restrictions	are	on	private	FM	radio	stations	 that	rebroadcast	news	from	 the	 British	 Broadcasting	 Corporation,	 Radio	 Free	 Europe/Radio	 Liberty	(RFE/RL)2.	This	demonstrates	the	extent	to	which	Putin	controls	the	Russian	media.	Freedom	 House	 (2015)	 also	 reports	 that	 Russian	 propaganda	 is	 broadcast	 into	Ukraine,	and	that	these	broadcasts	frequently	contain	false	information	designed	to	convince	 Ukrainian	 citizens	 that	 they	 are	 being	 oppressed	 by	 the	 Ukrainian	government.	A	thorough	analysis	of	Russian	sentiment	was	conducted	by	Andrew	Wilson	(Wilson,	 2014).	 He	 found	 that	 Russia	 has	 long	 viewed	 NATO	 as	 encroaching	 on	Russian	 territory,	 and	 that	 Russians	 feel	 surrounded,	 with	 an	 increasingly	 united	
																																																								2	Freedom	House	informs	that:	“in	November	2012,	RFE/RL	lost	its	medium-wave	local	broadcasting	license	due	to	the	implementation	of	a	2011	law	prohibiting	foreign	ownership	of	broadcast	media.”	(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/russia#.VSa1ykgl5Qc	)	
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Europe	on	one	side	and	the	United	States	on	the	other.	Russia	views	the	European	Union	(EU)	as	an	extension	of	NATO	and	therefore	wishes	to	prevent	Ukraine	from	joining	the	EU,	so	that	Ukraine	can	serve	as	a	buffer	between	Russia	and	NATO.	For	this	 reason,	 Russia	 pressured	 Ukraine’s	 president	 Viktor	 Yanukovych	 to	 accept	 a	bailout	 in	 November	 2013	 in	 return	 for	 his	 promise	 to	 not	 join	 the	 EU.	 Shortly	thereafter	 the	 Euromaidan	movement	 in	Maidan	 Square	 in	Kiev	 began	 to	 protest.	They	protested	throughout	the	early	part	of	2014.	On	February	23,	Yanukovych	was	ousted	from	power	and	fled	to	Russia.	Beginning	February	26,	Russia	sent	troops	into	Crimea.	By	early	March,	these	troops	 controlled	 Crimea.	 An	 ad	 hoc	 referendum,	 on	 whether	 Crimea	 should	formally	 join	 Russia,	 was	 held	 on	 March	 16,	 and	 a	 majority	 voted	 in	 favor.	 The	reliability	 of	 this	 vote	 has	 been	 questioned	 (European	 Commission,	 2014).	Meanwhile,	 unrest	 grew	 throughout	 February	 and	 March	 in	 Donbass,	 as	 ethnic	Russians	raised	on	the	propaganda	that	they	were	being	oppressed,	mistreated,	and	embarrassed	by	Kiev	(Freedom	House,	2015)	began	to	advocate	for	their	rights.	For	example,	 ethnic	 Russians	 in	 Donbass	 began	 demonstrating	 in	 favor	 of	 making	Russian	 a	 formal	 second	 language	 of	 Ukraine,	 and	 demonstrating	 against	 the	Euromaidan	demonstrators	in	Kiev	(i.e.	against	joining	the	EU).	As	unfolding	events	made	 it	 clear	 that	 Kiev’s	 government	 was	 weak	 (e.g.	 unable	 to	 prevent	 the	referendum	 in	 Crimea),	 these	 demonstrations	 occurred	with	 increasing	 frequency	and	strength.	Demonstrations	were	strongest	in	the	cities	of	Donetsk	and	Luhansk,	two	 of	 the	 most	 populous	 cities	 in	 Donbass.	 Demonstrators	 began	 rioting	 and	making	demands	on	March	1.	The	 first	major,	 violent	act	of	 the	budding	 rebellion	
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was	 when	 rioters	 took	 over	 the	 Donetsk	 Regional	 State	 Administration	 (RSA)	Building	during	the	period	of	March	1-6.	While	 these	 rioters	 were	 making	 their	 decisions,	 they	 were	 hearing	(primarily	 from	Russian	news	outlets)	 about	Russia's	move	 to	 take	Crimea,	 about	Ukraine's	weakness	in	the	capital,	and	about	how	other	media	should	not	be	trusted	(e.g.	 was	 being	manipulated	 by	 NATO).	 These	 factors	 fed	 into	 the	 decision	 of	 the	rioters	 to	 become	 rebels	 seeking	 independence	 from	 Kiev.	 On	 March	 25,	 the	Ukrainian	 government	 banned	 four	 Russian	 television	 channels	 in	 Donbass,	claiming	 that	 the	 broadcasts	 “threaten	 the	 national	 security,	 sovereignty,	 and	territorial	 integrity	of	Ukraine”	 (Kates,	2014),	but	 this	action	came	 too	 late,	as	 the	rebellion	 was	 already	 underway.	 Even the pro-Russian rebels realized the value of 
Russian broadcasts: in April, when the offices of the state television network in Donetsk 
were captured, the rebels disabled Ukrainian broadcasts and began again broadcasting 
“Kremlin-backed Russian channels” (Tsvetkova, 2014).	Chronology	Of	The	Main	Events	Leading	to	Conflict	In	Donbass:		
§ March	1,	2014	-	a	group	of	pro-Kiev	protesters	are	attacked	and	beaten	by	pro-Russian	demonstrators	in	Kharkiv,	Donbass.	The	police	do	not	intervene.	In	our	model,	this	increases	the	fear	of	punishment3	by	pro-Russian	rebels.		
§ March	 11,	 2014	 -	 the	 Ukrainian	 National	 Council	 for	 TV	 and	 Radio	Broadcasting	ordered	all	cable	operators	to	cease	broadcasting	a	number	of	state	controlled	Russian	channels.	The	National	Security	and	Defense	Council	stated	that	these	broadcasts	were	a	threat	to	national	security.	Evidence	was	presented	demonstrating	that	the	Russian	broadcasts	contained	staged,	fake	news	designed	to	make	Ukraine	look	bad	(Ennis,	2014).	
	
§ March	13,	 2014	 -	a	group	of	pro-Maidan	protesters	are	beaten,	and	one	 is	killed,	 by	 pro-Russian	 demonstrators	 in	 Donetsk,	 Donbass	 (Macdonald,	2014).	This	causes	an	increase	in	the	fear	of	punishment,	as	above.																																																									3	Factor	Ci	in	our	model.	
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§ March	16,	2014	–	pro-Russian	demonstrators	hold	staged	rallies	in	favor	of	a	 referendum,	 in	several	cities	 in	Donbass	 (Laughland,	2014).	 In	our	model	this	 contributes	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 reputational	 gain	 for	 publicly	 supporting	the	 pro-Russian	 movement,	 and	 hence	 contributes	 to	 the	 threshold	 effect	which	causes	the	rebellion	to	reach	critical	mass.		
§ March	 18,	 2014	 -	 Putin	 states	 that	 Russia	 will	 protect	 Russian-speaking	people	everywhere,	 including	in	Ukraine	(Kendall,	2014).	In	our	model,	this	lowers	the	perceived	probability	of	arrest	by	Ukrainian	forces	and	increases	the	probability	of	the	rebellion	succeeding.			
§ March	 25,	 2014	 -	 Ukraine	 bans	 Russian	 TV	 (Kates,	 2014),	 proving	 that	Russian	propaganda	was	a	 significant	 enough	 influence	 for	Kiev	 to	 actively	try	to	block	it.		
§ April	 6,	 2014	–	 this	date	marks	 the	 true	beginning	of	 the	War	 in	Donbass.	The	 Pro-Russian	 rebels	 announced	 a	 referendum	 and	 seized	 several	government	 buildings.	 In	 response,	 the	 central	 Ukrainian	 government	 sent	counter-terrorism	forces,	and	increased	fighting	ensued.		
§ Spring,	 2014	 –	 attacks	 against	 pro-Ukrainian	 protestors	 by	 pro-Russian	rebels	 become	 increasingly	 common,	 contributing	 to	 increased	 fear	 of	punishment	 in	 our	 model.	 Attacks	 occur	 in	 Luhansk	 (Fedosenko,	 2014),	Donetsk	 (Maceda	 and	 Kovalova,	 2014),	 Slavyansk	 (Luhn,	 2014).	Furthermore,	 the	 city	 of	 Sloviansk,	 controlled	 by	 pro-Russian	 rebels,	 is	besieged	by	Ukrainian	armed	forces,	Donetsk	is	shelled,	and	Putin	reiterates	his	promise	to	protect	Russian	speakers	everywhere	(Coalson,	2014).	These	events	contribute	to	fear	of	punishment	for	pro-Ukrainian	protesters,	fear	of	reprisals	by	residents	of	Donbass	(especially	Sloviansk	and	Donetsk),	and	an	increase	in	the	perceived	ability	of	pro-Russian	forces	to	win4.		Three	main	factors	emerge	from	the	chronology	above	and	contribute	in	our	model	to	shaping	the	context	of	the	armed	conflict	and	rebellion	in	Donbass:	1. Propaganda	through	state	ownership	of	media	in	Russia:		We	 argue	 that	 pro-Russian	 propaganda	 on	 local	media	 in	 Donbass	 created	beliefs	 that	 life	under	Russian,	or	Russian-like	rule	 is	better	 than	 life	under	the	existing	Ukrainian	rule.	The	idea	of	a	“New	Russia”	–	otherwise	an	archaic																																																									4	Respectively,	these	three	factors	are	Ci,	ci,	and	𝑝!! in	our	model.	
Page 9 of 29	
term	 in	 Russian	 history	 encyclopedias	 –	 promoted	 by	 pro-Russian	demonstrators	 and	 elsewhere	 on	 Russian	 TV	 and	 local	 radio,	 paints	 the	picture	of	 a	wonderful	 life	 in	Russia,	 and	a	 superiority	of	Russians	 and	 the	Russian	 form	 of	 governance	 and	 culture	 globally.	 Furthermore,	 Russian	propaganda	 in	 2013-2014	 gave	 the	 impression	 that	 ethnic	 Russians	 in	Ukraine	(and	elsewhere)	belong	with	Russia	(Freedom	House,	2014,	2015).	Lastly,	 the	propaganda	gave	the	 impression	that	ethnic	Russians	 in	Ukraine	were	 being	 oppressed	 by	 the	 Ukrainian	 central	 government,	 even	 if	 this	impression	is	not	borne	out	by	the	evidence.	2. Fear	of	acting	or	speaking	against	the	pro-Russian	movement:	We	argue	that	the	violent	reprisals	of	the	pro-Russian	forces	against	pro-Kiev	demonstrators	contributed	substantially	to	fear	factors	in	our	model,	leading	to	 a	 decreasing	 willingness	 of	 Donbass	 residents	 to	 resist	 the	 slide	 of	 the	region	into	violent	rebellion.	In	our	model	these	fear	factors	are	present	both	for	 supporters	 of	 Kiev	 and	 for	 residents	 without	 strong	 preferences	regarding	the	governance	of	Donbass.	3. Consolidation	of	Putin’s	power	following	the	Russians	taking	over	Crimea:	By	 taking	Crimea,	Vladimir	Putin	gave	 residents	of	Donbass	hope	 that	 they	could	 also	 join	 Russia.	 The	 referendum	 in	 Crimea	 spawned	 a	 similar	referendum	in	Donbass,	despite	pressure	from	Russia	against	the	hosting	of	such	a	referendum.		
3.	A	Contextual	Model	of	Choice		
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Building	on	the	existing	literature	modeling	revolutionary	non/participation	(in	particular,	 Kuran	 1989,	 1991;	Moore	 1995;	 Lichbach	 1994,	 1995;	 Petersen	 2001;	Leeson	 2010),	 we	 create	 a	 contextual	 choice	 framework	 to	 account	 for	 the	variability	in	individuals’	perception	of	costs	and	benefits	that	led	to	the	start	of	the	War	in	Donbass.		We	 consider	 several	 different	 option	 groups:	 the	 pro-Russian	 rebels,	 the	 pro-Western	movement,	and	the	pro-Ukranian.	We	seek	to	understand	how	contextual	factors,	 derived	 from	 the	 chronology	 of	 events	 outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	influenced	the	cost-benefit	calculations	that	went	 into	the	decision	of	a	resident	 in	the	Donbass	region	to	either	join	or	not	join	the	armed	rebellion.		For	any	individual	i	in	Donbass,	contemplating	rebellion	in	the	first	half	of	2014,	the	following	factors	come	into	play:	1. 𝐹! 	the	value	of	 freedom	from	Kiev.	Note	that	different	 individuals	may	have	different	views	on	what	 this	 freedom	will	mean.	For	 some	 it	means	 joining	Russia.	For	others	 it	means	creating	an	 independent,	 legitimate,	democratic	state.	For	others	it	means	seizing	power	to	hold	at	gun	point.	2. 𝑆! 		 the	 value	 of	 life	 under	 the	 status	 quo,	 i.e.	 if	 Kiev	 regains	 power	 over	Donbass.	3. 𝐴!!  the	 cost	 of	 being	 arrested	 if	 Kiev	 regains	 power	 and	 if	 the	 individual	participated	in	the	rebellion.	4. 𝐴!!  	the	 cost	 of	 being	 arrested	 if	 the	 rebellion	 succeeds	 and	 the	 individual	 i	actively	opposed	the	rebellion.	5. 𝑐! 	the	cost,	 inflicted	by	pro-Russian	 forces,	of	not	 joining	 the	rebellion.	This	cost	might	include	loss	of	social	status,	property	loss,	or	even	receipt	of	fewer	rations	in	a	city	under	siege.		
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6. 𝐶! 	the	 cost,	 inflicted	 by	 pro-Russian	 forces,	 of	 advocating	 in	 favor	 of	Ukrainian	 rule	 in	Donbass.	 This	 cost	might	 include	 beatings,	 property	 loss,	being	forced	into	hiding,	and	even	death.	7. 𝑉! 	the	desire	for/against	violence.	8. 𝑅 𝑦!  the	 increase/decrease	 in	 reputation	 for	 publicly	 taking	 position	𝑦! .	Here	𝑦! 	could	 be	 publicly	 supporting	 the	 pro-Russian	 rebellion	 or	 publicly	supporting	the	pro-Ukrainian	forces.	9. 𝑁 𝑦! 𝑥! 	the	 integrity	 for	 publicly	 taking	 position	 𝑦! 	while	 privately	supporting	𝑥! .	 Here	𝑥! 	could	 be	 either	 pro-Russian	 or	 pro-Ukrainian.	 This	term	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 measuring	 the	 cost	 to	 individual	 i	 for	 publicly	espousing	a	position	in	conflict	with	his/her	private	beliefs.		We	shall	assume	all	but	the	last	three	of	the	quantities	listed	above	are	positive,	so	our	equations	for	expected	payoffs	will	use	subtraction	for	quantities	where	the	payoff	 is	 negative	 (e.g.	𝐴! ,𝐴! , 𝑐,𝐶).	Our	 evidence	 for	 including	𝐶! 	and	𝑐! are	 the	events	 chronicled	 in	 Section	2.	We	also	 tacitly	 assume	𝐶! 	>	𝑐! , which	also	 explains	our	notation.	The	last	two	quantities	listed	above	also	appear	in	(Kuran,	1989).	We	allow	 the	 last	 three	 quantities	 (𝑉! ,𝑅 𝑦! ,𝑁 𝑦! 𝑥! ), 	to	 be	 either	 positive	 or	negative5	depending	 on	 the	 individual	 i.	 Neither	 we,	 nor	 Kuran,	 claim	 to	 have	precise	formulas	for	these	three	quantities.	A	first	approximation	to	𝑅 𝑦! 	might	be	𝛼 ∗  #!#!	where	𝛼	is	 some	 scaling	 factor,	 #S	 is	 the	 number	 of	 individual	 i's	 friends	supporting	position	𝑦! , and	#T	is	the	total	number	of	friends	of	i.	A	weighted	version	of	 this	 formula,	 with	 friends	 weighted	 by	 how	 much	 individual	 i	 respects	 their	
																																																								5	Alternately	we	could	also	introduce	a	sign	variable	𝜎! .	Kuran	assumes	0<𝑦! 	and 𝑥!<1,	but	this	convention	does	not	affect	the	theory	in	any	way.	
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opinions,	 would	 be	 better 6 .	 An	 even	 better	 approach	 would	 mimic	 Google's	PageRank	algorithm	and	conduct	an	iterative	approach	to	fully	include	the	network	structure	when	computing	the	weights.	Even	 without	 a	 precise	 formula	 for	𝑅 𝑦! ,	 some	 heuristics	 are	 clear.	 For	example,	 as	 the	 number	 of	 public	 supporters	 of	 the	 pro-Russian	 movement	increases,	 so	 does	𝑅 𝑦! ,	 where	𝑦! 	is	 the	 position	 of	 supporting	 the	 pro-Russian	movement	(similarly,	the	reputational	gain	of	supporting	Ukraine	goes	down).		
3.1.	Solving	The	Individual	Participation	Problem		 Let	𝑝!! 	be	the	probability	of	the	rebellion	succeeding,	according	to	individual	
i.	The	expected	payoff	of	joining	the	pro-Russian	forces	is	then	𝐸 𝑅 =  𝑝!! ∗  𝐹! – 1− 𝑝!! 𝐴!! + 𝑅 𝑦! + 𝑁 𝑦! 𝑥! )+ 𝑉! 	Here	𝑉! 	would	 be	 positive	 if	 individual	 i	 enjoys	 violence	 and	 would	 be	negative	otherwise.	We	assume	that	 joining	 the	pro-Russian	 forces	(or	 indeed,	 the	pro-Kiev	 forces)	 entails	 a	 non-negative	 amount	 of	 violence,	 which	 can	 be	 zero.	Likewise,	𝑅 𝑦! 	would	 be	 positive	 if	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 value	 that	 individual	 i	derives	from	reputation	comes	from	pro-Russian	individuals.	Lastly,	𝑁 𝑦! 𝑥!  would	be	positive	 if	𝑦! =  𝑥! 	and	negative	otherwise	since,	as	Kuran	points	out,	 there	 is	a	cost	to	the	individual	for	preference	falsification.	The	expected	payoff	for	joining	the	pro-Ukrainian	forces	is:	𝐸 𝑈 = 𝑆! 1− 𝑝!! − 𝐴!! ∗ 𝑝!! − 𝐶! + 𝑅 𝑦! + 𝑁 𝑦! 𝑥! )+ 𝑉! 																																																									6	Kuran	also	defines	public	sentiment	as	 𝑤!𝑦! , where	𝑤! 	is	the	weight	of	individual	i's	decision.	He	then	uses	𝑦!  to	argue	about	thresholds	and	domino	effects.		
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Lastly,	the	expected	payoff	for	not	joining	either	side	is:	𝐸 𝑁𝐽 = 𝑆! 1− 𝑝!! − 𝑐! + 𝑅 𝑦! + 𝑁 𝑦! 𝑥! )+ 𝑉! 	Here	𝑉!  will	 be	negative	 if	 the	 individual	wants	 violence	 and	positive	 if	 the	individual	does	not	like	violence.	We	expect 𝑅 𝑦! 	to	be	fairly	small,	though	perhaps	larger	than	the	reputation	gained	from	joining	the	pro-Russian	rebellion,	depending	on	the	social	network	of	individual	i.	Note	that	𝑁 𝑦! 𝑥!  could	be	negative,	either	if	the	 individual's	 preference	𝑥! 	is	 to	 advocate	 for	 remaining	 with	 Ukraine	 but	 the	individual	does	not	(perhaps	i	is	afraid	of	the	reprisal	𝐶!), or	if	the	preference	is	pro-Russian	 but	 the	 individual	 does	 not	 join	 the	 pro-Russian	 forces	 (perhaps	 the	individual	is	afraid	of	arrest	𝐴!! ).	Let	us	consider	some	heuristics	for	the	quantities	in	the	equations	above.	We	encourage	the	reader	to	refer	back	to	the	chronology	of	events	for	our	justification	of	these	heuristics.	First,	as	the	number	of	Russian	troops	in	Donbass	increased,	the	cost	𝐶!  increased,	and	this	resulted	in	fewer	and	fewer	pro-Ukraine	demonstrations.	Similarly,	the	probability	of	arrest	by	the	police	decreased,	both	because	the	police	cannot	arrest	a	critical	mass,	but	also	because	the	police	might	be	afraid	to	confront	armed,	 trained	Russian	 soldiers.	 Additionally,	 after	 Crimea's	 take-over	 by	Russian	forces,	𝐹!  increased	because	many	in	Donbass	began	to	believe	they	might	also	join	Russia	 (as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 demonstrations	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 referendum	 to	 join	Russia,	 and	 the	 referendum	 itself	 in	 April).	 Even	 for	 an	 individual	 i	 who	 wanted	freedom	 from	 Kiev	 (but	 perhaps	 did	 not	 want	 to	 join	 Russia)	 there	would	 be	 an	increase	 in	𝐹!  after	 i	 realized	 Kiev's	 weakness	 and	 his/her	 ability	 to	 profit	 in	 the	new	power	vacuum.	
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As	 the	 amount	 of	 Russian	 propaganda	 streaming	 across	 the	 border	 from	Russia	 to	 Donbass	 increased,	 the	 perceived	 probability	 of	 success	𝑝!! 	for	 the	rebellion	increased	(because	more	and	more	individuals	perceived	that	Putin	would	help	 them	 if	 they	needed	his	help).	Similarly,	 the	perceived	benefit	of	𝐹! 	increased	because	the	propaganda	and	referendum	made	it	appear	that	 joining	Russia	was	a	real	and	positive	possibility.	Similarly,	the	perceived	payoff	of	remaining	under	the	status	 quo	𝑆! 	decreased	 because	 the	 propaganda	 helped	 convince	 some	 that	 they	would	 be	 better	 off	 without	 Ukraine,	 or	 even	 that	 they	were	 being	 oppressed	 by	Ukraine	 (Freedom	House,	 2015).	 Lastly,	 the	 reputational	 benefit	 from	 joining	 the	rebellion	increased,	as	we	have	already	remarked.		
3.2.	Solving	The	First-Mover	Problem		We	 now	 consider	 the	 first-mover	 problem	 for	 individuals	 where	 true	preference	𝑥! 	is	pro-Russian.	For	such	individuals,	𝑝!!  must	have	seemed	fairly	small.	However,	personal	beliefs	about	how	much	better	 life	would	be	without	rule	 from	Kiev	(perhaps	influenced	by	Russian	propaganda)	can	overcome	this	small	𝑝!! . More	importantly,	𝑅 𝑦!  can	 be	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 cultural	 beliefs,	 as	 evidenced	through	 historical	 research	 on	 “Russian	 conservatism”	 by	 Richard	 Pipes	 (Pipes,	2005),	 and	 manifested	 by	 an	 increase	 in	 pro-Russian	 demonstrations	 in	 Moscow	and	in	Kiev	over	recent	years.	Ariel	Cohen	(Cohen,	2007)	observes	that,	since	Putin’s	consolidation	 of	 power	 in	 the	 Kremlin,	 “ethnic	 nationalism	 and	 extremism	 have	reemerged	 in	 modern	 Russia”,	 while	 the	 government	 has	 adopted	 authoritarian	tendencies	and	has	attempted	to	 imbue	 in	citizens	a	deep	trust	 in	 the	government	
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and	a	belief	in	the	superiority	of	the	Russian	form	of	governance.	As	a	result,	citizens	and	have	been	seen	to	stand	up,	defensively,	to	non-Russian	authority	increasingly	in	 recent	 years.	 In	 a	 related	 vein,	 Andrew	Wilson	discusses	 "Russia's	 addiction	 to	dangerous	myths,"	and	claims	that	Russians	have	"the	world's	biggest	persecution	complex"	(Wilson,	2014).	This	suggests	that,	 for	pro-Russian	individuals,	the	effect	of	𝐴!! 	may	not	be	as	large	as	an	observer	might	believe,	e.g.	because	being	arrested	while	 standing	 up	 to	 authority	 could	 give	 even	 more	 positive	 feedback	 to	 one's	reputation	𝑅 𝑦! .	Lastly,	 individuals	 with	 lexicographic	 preferences	 for	 violence	 will	 have	𝑉! 	large	and	positive,	and	this	will	help	offset	the	large	negative	term	 1− 𝑝! ! 𝐴!! .	We	therefore	 conclude	 that	 first-movers	 will	 be	 drawn	 from	 intrinsically	 violent	individuals,	 individuals	who	feel	𝑝!! 	is	not	so	small	(e.g.	who	believe	Russian	forces	will	swoop	in	and	aid	the	rebellion),	individuals	with	strong	anti-authority	(and	pro-Russian)	culture,	and	individuals	who	feel	the	benefits	of	a	successful	rebellion	(𝐹!)	are	so	much	greater	than	the	current	status	quo	(𝑆!)	to	justify	the	risk	of	arrest	𝐴!! .		After	 these	 first-movers	 start	 the	 rebellion,	 the	 proportion	 of	 publicly	 pro-Russian	supporters	increases.	This	causes	a	threshold	phenomenon,	similar	to	that	observed	by	Kuran,	wherein	the	next	wave	of	slightly	more	cautious	individuals	join	the	 rebellion,	 leading	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 pro-Russian	 supporters,	leading	the	next	group	of	even	more	cautious	individuals	to	join,	and	so	on,	until	a	majority	 of	 individuals	 have	 joined	 the	 rebellion.	 Our	 model	 shows	 that,	 after	enough	 pro-Russian	 supporters	 have	 joined	 the	 movement,	 others	 who	 want	independence	 (but	 not	 necessarily	 to	 join	 Russia	will	 join),	 because	 they	 see	 that	
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Ukraine	is	weak	and	now	is	the	time	to	break	away.	Lastly,	in	the	face	of	a	majority	in	favor	of	the	movement,	individuals	who	fear	the	costs	𝐶! , 𝑐! ,	and	𝐴!! 	of	not	joining	or	of	resisting	the	rebellion	will	publicly	support	it	out	of	fear.	For	individuals	whose	true	preference	is	pro-Ukrainian,	the	default	position	is	 to	 allow	 the	 police	 to	 stop	 the	 rebellion.	 After	 realizing	 that	 the	 police	 are	incapable,	 individuals	 whose	 integrity	 demands	 action	 might	 decide	 to	 protest	against	 the	 pro-Russians.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 2,	 these	 protests	 occurred	frequently	 in	 the	 early	 days	 of	 the	 rebellion.	 As	 the	 chronology	 of	 events	demonstrates,	both	the	pro-Russian	and	pro-Ukrainian	forces	were	violent,	so	again	individuals	 with	 a	 lexicographic	 preference	 for	 violence	 would	 be	 likely	 first-movers.	Clearly,	if	the	expected	payoff	for	joining	the	pro-Ukraine	movement	is	to	be	positive,	 then	𝑆!(1− 𝑝!! ),𝐶! ,	 and	𝑁! 	would	 need	 to	 be	 greater	 than	𝐶! ,𝑝!! ,	 and	𝐴!! .	However,	as	discussed	 in	Section	2,	when	the	rebellion	got	stronger,	 the	cost	𝐶! 	of	opposing	 it	 increased.	 Time	 and	 again,	 pro-Russian	mobs	 attacked	 pro-Ukrainian	demonstrations	with	baseball	bats	(see	chronology	above),	demonstrating	to	all	that	𝐶! 	could	 be	 large	 (and	 suggesting	 that	 the	 cost	𝐴!! ,	after	 a	 rebel	 victory,	might	 be	even	more	brutal).	Meanwhile,	𝑝! 	increased	(from	all	 individuals'	point	of	view)	as	the	rebellion	grew.	Our	model	predicts	 in	 this	case	 that	 the	number	of	 individuals	publicly	supporting	Ukraine	would	decrease	under	these	circumstances,	and	indeed	that	is	precisely	what	occurred	in	the	late	spring	and	early	summer	months.	In	the	next	section	we	discuss	the	dynamics	of	the	three	populations:	pro-Russian,	pro-Ukrainian,	and	those	who	do	not	advocate	for	either	position.	Our	model	allows	individuals	to	flow	back	and	forth	between	these	groups,	and	we	study	
Page 17 of 29	
how	the	various	factors	in	our	model	drive	these	types	of	decisions.	Observe	that	the	system	is	not	closed:	some	individuals	in	Donbass	(e.g.	pro-Ukrainian	activists)	may	choose	to	flee	back	into	conflict-free	Ukrainian	territory	rather	than	continue	living	under	pro-Russian	rule.	Some	individuals	who	are	pro-Russian	but	do	not	wish	to	join	the	rebellion	might	choose	to	simply	move	to	Russia.	Lastly,	individuals	in	the	third	group	might	choose	to	flee	the	region	to	avoid	the	conflict	altogether,	regardless	of	their	preferences	for	who	will	rule	in	Donbass.	Indeed,	a	recent	report	by	The	Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	(OHCHR)	suggests	that	upwards	of	one	million	people	chose	to	flee	the	region,	either	internally	(within	Ukraine),	or	externally	(mostly	in	Russia),	rather	than	join	any	of	the	groups	of	actors	we	have	considered.	Note	in	addition	that	individuals	from	Ukraine	(e.g.	members	of	Ukraine's	state	security	service,	the	SBU)	can	enter	the	system	and	decrease	the	probability	of	the	rebellion	succeeding,	and	individuals	from	Russia	(e.g.	the	`Little	Green	Men'	stationed	in	Crimea	in	Spring	20147)	can	enter	the	region	and	increase	the	probability	that	the	rebellion	succeeds.	We	believe	these	groups	merit	their	own	study,	and	that	they	would	be	a	good	subject	for	future	work,	but	we	have	not	focused	on	them	here.		
3.3.	Comparing	The	Payoff	Equations	
	 We	 now	 analyze	 the	 payoff	 equations	 to	 determine	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	system.	 We	 first	 consider	 the	 decision	 of	 not	 joining	 either	 group	 (NJ)	 vs.	 the	
																																																								7	Richard	Sawka	writes	of	“some	12,500	service	people	stationed	in	the	peninsula	…	wearing	green	uniforms	without	insignia,	the	men	claimed	to	be	local	volunteers	and	were	soon	dubbed	‘little	green	men’.	In	fact,	they	were	highly	trained	Russian	special	forces	using	advanced	technologies	to	achieve	the	bloodless	takeover	of	the	peninsula.”	(Sakwa	2015,	p.104)	
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decision	 to	 advocate	 in	 favor	 of	 Ukraine.	 Our	 analysis	 of	 events	 in	 2014	 suggests	that,	as	time	went	on,	the	payoff	for	the	former	was	greater	than	the	payoff	for	the	latter,	leading	to	fewer	and	fewer	pro-Ukrainian	protests.	We	write	this	inequality	in	the	language	of	our	model,	 introducing	subscripts	to	help	us	remember	if	the	R,	N,	and	V	terms	are	for	the	NJ	population	or	the	U	population:	𝑆! 1− 𝑝!! − 𝑐! + 𝑅 𝑁𝐽 + 𝑁 𝑁𝐽 𝑥! + 𝑉!"! >> 𝑆! 1− 𝑝!! − 𝐴!! ∗ 𝑝!! −  𝐶! + 𝑅 𝑈 + 𝑁 𝑈 𝑥! + 𝑉!! 	After	removing	like	terms	and	reshuffling	terms	we	are	left	with	𝑅 𝑁𝐽 − 𝑅 𝑈 + 𝑁 𝑁𝐽 𝑥! − 𝑁 𝑈 𝑥! + 𝑉!!! −  𝑉!! > −𝐴!! ∗ 𝑝!! + [𝑐! − 𝐶!]				 As	we	have	remarked,	𝑐! − 𝐶! 	is	negative,	and	beatings	by	pro-Russian	mobs	only	make	it	more	negative,	as	well	as	making	-𝐴!!  more	negative.	The	inequality	is	therefore	 satisfied	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 left-hand	 side	 is	 positive,	 or	 at	 least	 not	 too	negative.	 As	 more	 and	 more	 individuals	 support	 the	 rebellion,	 the	 first	 term	becomes	positive	rather	 than	negative,	since	supporting	Ukraine	will	be	more	and	more	likely	to	 lead	to	negative	reputational	benefit.	Next	consider	the	V	 terms:	we	assume	 preference	 towards	 violence	 is	 an	 intrinsic	 quality	 and	 therefore	 time	independent.	 It	 is	 possible	 individual	 i	 has	 a	 large	 positive	𝑉!! 	(i.e.	 prefers	 violent	settings),	 causing	 the	 third	 term	 on	 the	 left	 above	 to	 be	 negative.	 Even	 so,	 this	difference	is	constant,	whereas	the	right	hand	side	is	 increasingly	negative	as	time	passes.	Therefore,	 even	pro-Ukrainians	who	prefer	violence	will	 eventually	decide	it's	 better	 not	 to	 oppose	 the	 pro-Russian	 forces.	 Lastly,	 we	 consider	 the	 integrity	terms	N.	These	terms	seem	most	likely	to	force	the	left-hand	side	above	to	become	negative,	since	if	𝑥! = 𝑈	then	𝑁(𝑁𝐽|𝑥!)	is	negative	and	𝑁(𝑈|𝑥!)	is	large	and	positive,	
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so	the	middle	term	on	the	left	above	is	large	and	negative.	The	relationship	between	integrity	and	time	is	unclear;	Kuran	points	out	that	𝑁 (𝑦|𝑥!)	is	increasingly	negative	over	 time	 if	𝑦! ≠ 𝑥! , but	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	𝑁 (𝑥!|𝑥!)	is	 increasingly	 positive	 over	time.	Furthermore,	the	weight	of	the	integrity	term	relative	to	the	other	terms	above	has	not	been	carefully	studied,	partially	due	to	the	difficulty	of	obtaining	data	on	this	question.	However,	the	increase	of	𝐶! ,	𝐴!! ,	and	𝑝!! 	over	time	is	effectively	unbounded	(especially	 considering	 that	 several	 pro-Ukrainian	 protesters	 died),	 whereas	integrity	 terms	 are	most	 likely	 bounded,	 since	 acting	 against	 one’s	 preferences	 is	usually	preferable	 to	beatings	or	death.	This	explains	why	 fewer	and	 fewer	would	choose	to	publicly	support	the	pro-Ukrainian	movement	over	time.	For	a	different	derivation	of	this	fact,	consider	solving	the	equation	above	for	𝑝!! .	Then	an	individual	will	choose	𝑦! = 𝑁𝐽	over	𝑦! = 𝑈	as	soon	as:	
𝑝!! > 𝑐!−𝐶! − 𝑅 𝑁𝐽 + 𝑅 𝑈 − 𝑁(𝑁𝐽|𝑥! + 𝑁 𝑈 𝑥! − 𝑉!"! + 𝑉!!𝐴!! 																		Viewed	in	this	light,	we	see	that	the	strictly	increasing	nature	of	𝑝!! 	(making	the	 left-hand	 side	 larger),	 of	𝐴!! 	(making	 the	 right-hand	 side	 smaller),	 and	 of	𝐶! 	(making	the	right-hand	side	smaller)	contribute	significantly	to	this	equation	being	satisfied	 over	 time,	 hence	 to	 individuals	 choosing	 to	 do	 nothing	 (NJ)	 rather	 than	demonstrate	 in	 favor	 of	 Ukraine	 (U).	 Furthermore,	 as	 the	 most	 fearful	 pro-Ukrainians	 allow	 themselves	 to	 be	 silenced,	𝑝!! 	increases	 even	 more,	 leading	 to	 a	Kuran-style	 threshold	 in	which	 increasing	numbers	of	pro-Ukrainians	are	silenced	until	 the	 only	 supporters	 remaining	 are	 those	 for	 whom	 the	 integrity	 term	
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dominates	 all	 others8.	 Thus,	 we	 have	 explained	 the	 decrease	 in	 pro-Ukrainian	protests—matching	observations	 from	2014—due	 in	 large	part	 to	 attacks	on	pro-Ukrainian	protesters	gathered	at	rallies	in	Donetsk	(Reuters	2014).		We	turn	now	to	the	question	of	whether	an	 individual	 i	chooses	to	publicly	support	 the	 pro-Russian	movement	 (𝑦! = 𝑅)	or	whether	 to	 do	 nothing	 (𝑦! = 𝑁𝐽).	We	choose	to	omit	the	case	of	an	individual	deciding	between	pro-Russian	and	pro-Ukrainian	 activism,	 because	 these	 movements	 were	 in	 direct	 opposition	 to	 one	another,	making	the	third	option	(NJ)	more	attractive.	In	order	for	an	individual	to	choose	R	over	NJ	the	following	inequality	must	be	satisfied:	𝑝!! ∗ 𝐹! − 1−  𝑝!! + 𝑅 𝑅 + 𝑁 𝑅 𝑥! + 𝑉!!> 𝑆! 1− 𝑝!! − 𝑐! + 𝑅 𝑁𝐽 + 𝑁 𝑁𝐽 𝑥! + 𝑉!"! 	Solving	for	𝑝!! 	we	obtain	the	following	equivalent	inequality:	
𝑝!! > 𝑆! − 𝑐! + 𝐴!! + 𝑟 𝑛𝑗 − 𝑟 𝑟 + 𝑁 𝑁𝐽 𝑥! − 𝑁 𝑅 𝑥! + 𝑉!"! − 𝑉!!𝐹! + 𝑆! + 𝐴!! 	We	use	 this	 inequality	 to	make	 several	 observations.	 First,	 if	 the	perceived	value	𝐹! 	of	independence	from	Kiev	increases	(e.g.	due	to	Russian	propaganda),	then	the	right	hand	side	decreases,	making	i	more	likely	to	support	the	rebellion.	As	the	cost	𝑐!of	not	joining	increases	(e.g.	due	to	pro-Russian	forces	gaining	more	power	in	Donbass),	 then	 the	 right	 side	 decreases,	 making	 i	 more	 likely	 to	 support	 the	rebellion.	Next,	 consider	 the	 reputation	 terms.	Observe	 that	R(NJ)	can	be	assumed	small	because	one	does	not	derive	reputational	gains	 from	taking	no	action.	While	
																																																								8	One	could	similarly	solve	the	equation	above	for	𝐶! 	or	𝐴!! ,	and	would	discover	the	same	conclusions	due	to	the	same	considerations.		
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R R  may	 have	 been	 negative	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 rebellion;	 it	 became	 increasingly	positive	as	the	number	of	supporters	of	the	rebellion	increased.	This	shift	causes	the	right	 hand	 side	 of	 the	 inequality	 to	 decrease,	making	 i	more	 likely	 to	 support	 the	rebellion.		Next,	 consider	 the	 integrity	 terms.	 If	 an	 individual	 internally	 supports	 the	pro-Russian	movement	then	this	decreases	the	right-hand	side	of	the	 inequality.	 If	an	 individual	 does	 not	 support	 the	 pro-Russian	 movement,	 then	𝑁(𝑅(𝑥! ))	 is	negative,	 so	 this	 increases	 the	 right-hand	 side	 and	 makes	 it	 less	 likely	 i	 would	support	 the	 rebellion.	 However,	 as	 we	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 comparison,	 the	integrity	terms	are	bounded	and	can	be	dominated	by	fear	terms	such	as	𝑐! .	If	 the	 preference	 for	 violence	 is	 large	 then	 the	 right	 hand	 side	 decreases,	making	 i	 more	 likely	 to	 support	 the	 rebellion.	 Conversely,	 if	 the	 desire	 against	violence	 is	 large,	 so	𝑉!"! > 0	and	𝑉!! < 0,	 then	 the	 individual	would	be	 less	 likely	 to	support	 the	 pro-Russian	 movement.	 However,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 the	 violence	preference	term	is	constant	over	time,	hence	can	be	dominated	by	the	other	terms	in	the	inequality	over	time.	Lastly,	 we	 consider	 the	 terms	 appearing	 in	 both	 the	 numerator	 and	 the	denominator.	 In	 general,	 fear	 of	 arrest	would	be	 a	 large	motivating	 factor	 against	rebelling.	However,	as	time	passed	and	evidence	accrued	to	demonstrate	that	most	pro-Russian	activists	were	not	being	arrested,	𝐴!! 	decreased.	 In	 the	 fraction	above,	this	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 allowing	 the	 other	 terms	 to	 become	more	 important	 in	 the	decision	 to	 rebel	 or	 not	 rebel.	 Similarly,	 as	 propaganda	 made	 the	 status	 quo	𝑆!appear	less	attractive,	that	term	decreased,	allowing	terms	such	as	𝐶! ,	𝑐! 	and	𝑅(𝑅)	
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to	play	a	larger	role.	Finally,	while	all	of	the	terms	above	were	shifting,	so	too	was	𝑝!! 	increasing,	e.g.	as	more	people	publicly	supported	the	rebellion,	as	fewer	protesters	were	being	arrested,	 etc.	This	makes	 the	 left-hand	side	 larger,	 so	 the	 inequality	 is	more	likely	to	be	satisfied.	To	 summarize,	 pro-Russian	 propaganda,	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 public	supporters	 of	 the	 pro-Russian	movement,	 an	 increasing	 fear	 of	 the	 consequences	𝑐!  of	 not	 joining	 the	 pro-Russian	 movement,	 and	 a	 decreasing	 fear	 of	 arrest	 all	contributed	to	making	the	 inequality	above	easier	to	satisfy,	and	therefore	making	individuals	more	likely	to	join	the	rebellion.	Model	shortcomings:	We	only	consider	actors	in	Donbass.	Our	model	includes	pro-Russian	rebels,	pro-Ukraine	activists,	and	residents	of	Donbass	who	do	not	 take	action	 in	 favor	of	either	 group.	 Our	 model	 includes	 factors	 for	 preference	 falsification	 following	Kuran,	and	these	terms	are	particularly	important	for	the	third	group	of	actors	listed	above.	 Our	 model	 also	 factors	 in	 individuals	 with	 a	 lexicographic	 preference	 for	violence,	and	we	demonstrate	that	these	individuals	will	be	the	first-movers.	Russians	in	Russia	are	not	explicitly	present	in	our	model.	However,	Russian	propaganda	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 Russian	 troops	 in	 Donbass	 (whether	 they	 were	there	officially	or	not)	strengthen	the	belief	in	success	of	the	first	group	of	actors	we	consider	 and	 help	 push	 them	 towards	 action.	 The	 induced	 beliefs9	of	 the	 pro-
																																																								
9 We call “induced beliefs” the beliefs individuals come to hold as a result of their persisted exposure to 
censored media channels (used as a tool to influence popular opinion in against political threats and/or 
rivals). 
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Russian	 rebels	 explain	 their	 willingness	 to	 be	 first-movers,	 as	 well	 as	 why	 the	rebellion	spread	so	quickly	in	the	spring	of	2014.	A	more	complex	model	could	also	feature	Ukrainian	peace	keeping	forces	in	Donbass,	Russian	forces	in	Donbass,	and	Russians	in	Russia	who	support	Donbass's	pro-Russian	 movement.	 Similarly,	 it	 would	 be	 worthwhile	 to	 consider	 how	 the	Euromaidan	movement	 fed	 into	 the	 start	of	 the	 rebellion	 in	Donbass.	Euromaidan	supporters	 were	 in	 general	 anti-Russian,	 and	 indeed	 were	 protesting	 partially	against	 President	 Yanukovych's	 deal	 with	 Russia	 to	 keep	 Ukraine	 out	 of	 the	European	Union	 (BBC,	 2014).	 Ironically,	 their	 protests	 in	Kiev	 forced	Yanukovych	out	 of	 power,	 and	 consequently	 demonstrated	 the	weakness	 of	 central	 Ukrainian	authority,	perhaps	contributing	to	the	budding	rebellion	in	Donbass.	However,	since	these	actions	did	not	take	place	in	Donbass,	we	have	chosen	not	to	include	them	in	our	model.	We	therefore	leave	such	considerations	to	the	interested	reader.		
4.	Conclusion		 In	 this	 paper	 we	 built	 a	 model	 which	 factors	 in	 rational	 decision-making,	lexicographic	 preferences	 for	 violence,	 preference	 falsification	 for	 non-activist	residents,	and	the	cultural	beliefs	of	pro-Russian	rebels.		We	have	argued	that	this	specific	cocktail	of	factors	led	to	the	start	of	the	War	in	Donbass	and	explains	the	speed	with	which	the	rebellion	spread.	If,	in	the	future,	similar	 factors	 are	 identified	 in	 other	 post-Soviet	 bloc	 countries,	 then	 the	 same	model	 (perhaps	 with	 different	 cultural	 factors)	 would	 suggest	 rebellion	 to	 soon	follow.	 Given	 Vladimir	 Putin's	 rhetoric	 about	 ethnic	 Russians	 worldwide	 (see	Coalson,	2014),	and	given	the	continuing	Kremlin	control	of	Russian	TV	and	radio,	
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including	broadcasts	 into	neighboring	countries	 (Freedom	House,	2015),	 it	 is	very	possible	these	factors	could	be	repeated	in	the	near	future.	If	the	EU	and	NATO	wish	to	 prevent	 the	War	 in	Donbass	 from	being	 repeated,	 then	 steps	must	 be	 taken	 to	reduce	the	effect	of	the	factors	which	led	to	rebellion	in	Ukraine.	For	 example,	 pro-Russian	 propaganda	 should	 be	 limited.	 The	 Ukrainian	government	took	this	step	in	Donbass	(Kates,	2014,	Prentice,	2014),	but	it	was	too	late	 to	 have	 any	 effect.	 Furthermore,	 steps	 must	 be	 taken	 to	 convince	 ethnic	Russians	that	they	are	not	being	persecuted	by	the	local	or	national	government.	As	stated	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 Andrew	 Wilson's	 book,	 ethnic	 Russians	 have	 "the	world's	 biggest	 persecution	 complex."	 It	 is	 important,	 therefore,	 to	 factor	 this	cultural	observation	into	all	interactions	with	ethnic	Russians.	Another	 important	 lesson	 from	 the	 War	 in	 Donbass	 is	 the	 importance	 of	protecting	 individuals	 who	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 pro-Russian	 movement.	 In	 most	democratic	Western	 countries	 protesters	 from	 both	 sides	 can	 safely	 demonstrate	without	fear	of	reprisal.	The	evidence	we	have	presented	demonstrates	conclusively	that	 such	 was	 not	 the	 case	 in	 Donbass	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 2014.	 Pro-Ukrainian	demonstrators	 were	 attacked	 time	 and	 again,	 and	 the	 police	 did	 little	 to	 protect	them.	 Our	 model	 demonstrates	 how	 this	 drove	 preference	 falsification	 for	individuals	from	the	pro-Ukraine	movement,	and	the	resulting	asymmetry	produced	the	 appearance	of	more	 support	 for	 the	pro-Russian	movement	 than	was	 actually	present.	A	domino	effect,	 similar	 to	 that	predicted	by	Kuran,	 followed.	 In	order	 to	prevent	this	sequence	of	events	from	recurring	in	other	post-Soviet	bloc	countries,	efforts	 should	 be	 taken	 to	 retain	 police	 officers	 who	 support	 the	 national	
Page 25 of 29	




Page 26 of 29	
Cowen,	 Tyler.	 2014.	 “Crimea	 Through	 a	 Game-Theory	 Lens.”	The	New	York	Times,	March	15.	http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/business/crimea-through-a-game-theory-lens.html.		Ennis,	Stephen.	“Ukraine	Hits	Back	at	Russian	TV	Onslaught	-	BBC	News.”	March	12,	2014.	Accessed	May	27,	2015.	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26546083.		Fedosenko,	Vasily.	“Protesters	Wielding	Baseball	Bats	Storm	Key	Building	in	Ukraine.”	CBS/AP.	April	29,	2014.	Accessed	May	30,	2015.	http://www.cbsnews.com/news/protesters-wielding-baseball-bats-storm-key-building-in-ukraine/.			Freedom	House.	“Russia	|	Country	Report	|	Freedom	in	the	World	|	2014.”	Accessed	May	15,	2015.	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/russia.		Freedom	House.	“Russia	|	Country	Report	|	Freedom	in	the	World	|	2015.”	Accessed	May	29,	2016.	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/russia.		Gorst,	Isabel.	“Counter-Protest	in	Ukraine	Turns	into	Rout.”	Washington	Post.	March	1,	2014.	Accessed	May	30,	2015.	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-northeast-ukraine-pro-maidan-occupiers-are-routed-by-counter-demonstrators/2014/03/01/6fb057e0-a162-11e3-9ba6-800d1192d08b_story.html.		Hale,	Henry	E.	2000.	“The	Parade	of	Sovereignties:	Testing	Theories	of	Secession	in	the	Soviet	Setting.”	British	Journal	of	Political	Science	30	(01):	31–56.			Kendall,	Bridget.	“Ukraine	crisis:	Putin	signs	Russia-Crimea	treaty.”	BBC,	March	18,	2014.		http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26630062			Kates,	Glenn.	“Should	Ukraine	Get	A	Pass	Because	Russia	Censors	Too?”	Radio	Free	
Europe,	 Radio	 Liberty,	 March	 27,	 2014.	 http://www.rferl.org/content/should-ukraine-get-a-pass-because-russia-censors-too/25312077.html		King,	Charles.	2010.	Extreme	Politics:	Nationalism,	Violence,	and	the	End	of	Eastern	Europe.	Oxford	University	Press.	Oxford:	New	York.			Kuran,	Timur.	1989.	 “Sparks	and	Prairie	Fires:	A	Theory	of	Unanticipated	Political	Revolution.”	Public	Choice	61	(1):	41–74.	doi:10.1007/BF00116762.		Kurrild-Klitgaard,	P.,	1997.	Rational	Choice,	Collective	Action	and	the	Paradox	of	Rebellion.	Copenhagen:	Institute	of	Political	Science	and	Political	Studies	Press.		
Page 27 of 29	
Laughland,	Oliver,	Urquhart,	Conal,	and	Yuhas,	Alan.	“Crimea	referendum:	early		results	indicate	'landslide'	for	secession	–	as	it	happened.”	The	Guardian,	March	16,	2014.	Accessed	May	30,	2015.	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/crimea-referendum-polls-open-live			Leeson,	Peter	T.	2010.	Rational	Choice,	Round	Robin,	and	Rebellion:	An	Institutional	
Solution	to	the	Problems	of	Revolution.	SSRN	Scholarly	Paper	ID	998031.	Rochester,	NY:	Social	Science	Research	Network.	http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=998031.		Lichbach,	M.I.,	1995.	The	Rebel’s	Dilemma:	Collective	Action	and	Collective	Dissent.	Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press.		Lichbach,	Mark	I.	1994.	“Rethinking	Rationality	and	Rebellion	Theories	of	Collective	Action	and	Problems	of	Collective	Dissent.”	Rationality	and	Society	6	(1):	8–39.			Luhn,	Alec.	“Ukrainian	Soldier	Killed	in	Offensive	against	pro-Russian	Rebels	in	Slavyansk.”	The	Guardian,	June	3,	2014.	Accessed	May	28,	2015.	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/ukraine-offensive-pro-russian-rebels-slavyansk.		Macdonald,	Alastair.	“One	dead	in	Ukraine	clash	in	eastern	city.”	Reuters,	March	13,	2014.	Accessed	May	30,	2015.	http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-donetsk-idUSBREA2C20Z20140313		Maceda,	Jim	and	Kovalova,	Albina.	“Pro-Ukraine	Demonstration	in	Donetsk	Turns	Violent”	NBC	News,	April	28,	2014.	http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/pro-ukraine-demonstration-donetsk-turns-violent-n91656		Mahoney,	 James.	 2000.	 “Rational	 Choice	 Theory	 and	 the	 Comparative	Method:	 An	Emerging	Synthesis?”	Studies	in	Comparative	International	Development	35	(2):	83–94.	doi:10.1007/BF02687472.		Moore,	Margaret,	ed.	1998.	National	Self-Determination	and	Secession.	1	edition.	Oxford ;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.		Moore,	W.H.,	1995.	Rational	rebels:	overcoming	the	free-rider	problem.	Political	Research.	Quarterly	48,	417-454.		OHCHR.	2014-2015.	“Report	on	the	human	rights	situation	in	Ukraine,”	http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/9thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf#sthash.HFQs2pv2.dpuf	.		
Page 28 of 29	
Olson,	Mancur.	1971.	The	Logic	of	Collective	Action:	Public	Goods	and	the	Theory	of	
Groups,	Second	Printing	with	New	Preface	and	Appendix.	Revised	edition.	Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press.		Pavkovic,	 Aleksandar,	 and	 Radan,	 Peter.	 2008.	 Creating	 New	 States	 :	 Theory	 and	Practice	 of	 Secession.	 Abingdon,	 Oxon,	 GBR:	 Ashgate	 Publishing	 Group.	Accessed	April	4,	2015.	ProQuest	ebrary.		Petersen,	 Roger	 D.	 2001.	 Resistance	 and	 Rebellion:	 Lessons	 from	 Eastern	 Europe.	Cambridge	University	Press.		Pipes,	Richard.	2007.	Russian	Conservatism	and	Its	Critics:	A	Study	in	Political	Culture.	annotated	edition	edition.	New	Haven,	Conn.;	London:	Yale	University	Press.			Prentice,	Alessandra.	“Ukraine	bans	Russian	TV	channels	for	airing	war	'propaganda'”	Reuters,	August	19,	2014.	Accessed	May	30,	2015.	http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-television-idUSKBN0GJ1QM20140819		Robert	H	Wade.	2015.	“Rethinking	the	Ukraine	Crisis.”	Economic	&	Political	Weekly,	February	21.			Coppieters,	Bruno,	and	Richard	Sakwa,	eds.	2003.	Contextualizing	Secession:	




Page 29 of 29	
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/ukraine-deadline-withdraw-cities-approaches.		Tullock,	Gordon.	1971.	“The	Paradox	of	Revolution.”	Public	Choice	11:	89–99.	
 Tullock,	G.,	1974.	The	Social	Dilemma:	The	Economics	of	War	and	Revolution.	Blacksburg,	VA:	Center	for	the	Study	of	Public	Choice.			Tsvetkova,	Maria.	“Separatists	Attack	Rally	in	Eastern	Ukrainian	City,”	Reuters.	April	28,	2014.	http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/28/us-ukraine-crisis-donetsk-idUSBREA3R10T20140428.			Wilson,	Andrew.	2014.	Ukraine	Crisis:	What	It	Means	for	the	West.	New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press.		“European	Commission	-	Press	Release	-	THE	HAGUE	DECLARATION	Following	the	G7	Meeting	on	24	March,	2014.”	Accessed	May	28,	2015.	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-82_en.htm.			
